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ABSTRACT 
Incumbent parties in Southern Europe experienced losses in their 
electoral support that came along with a series of economic reforms 
imposed by the EU and the IMF. However, recent theories of 
accountability would predict lower levels of economic voting given the 
limited room left for national governments to manoeuvre the economy. 
To resolve this puzzle, the paper presents and models quarterly vote 
intention time series data from Greece (2000–2012) and links it with the 
state of the economy. The empirical results show that after the bailout 
loan agreement the Greek voters significantly shifted their assignment of 
responsibility for (economic) policy outcomes from the EU to the 
national government, which in turn heightened the impact of objective 
economic conditions on governing party support.  The findings have 
implications for theories linking international structures, government 
constraints and democratic accountability. 
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Government Constraints  
and Economic Voting in Greece 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Although normative accounts of democracy expect citizens to hold their 
governments ac- countable in response to economic performance, a 
long list of factors make the relationship between the economy and the 
vote unstable (Powell and Whitten, 1993; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011; 
Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2012). This list of factors currently includes 
the moderating role of globalisation and international economic 
structures on which voters are less likely to hold a government 
accountable when they think that governments have limited room to 
manoeuvre the national economy (Hellwig, 2001; Hellwig and Samuels, 
2007; Duch and Stevenson, 2010). 
However, incumbent governments in countries with only minuscule 
room to propose and implement economic policy like Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain, and more notably Greece, experienced enormous defeats in the 
voting booth. Fianna Fáil won only 17% of the vote, almost 25% less 
compared to the 2007 Irish election, the Portuguese Socialist party 
shrunk by 8%, while PSOE (Spanish Socialists) lost 15% compared to the 
2008 election. In Greece the two consecutive elections revealed 
unprecedented voting patterns. In the May 6 election more than 2 
million voters (around 70%) abandoned the governing party. SYRIZA, a 
radical left party with a historical average in the 3.5-4% region won 17% 
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of the vote, and almost 7% of Greeks voted for the Neo–Fascist “Golden 
Dawn” party. The safest explanation of these voting patterns have been 
based on retrospective economic voting (Key, 1966; Fiorina, 1981; 
Kramer, 1983) and recent empirical research by Bartels (2011) shows 
evidence that the losses in incumbent vote shares are predominantly 
explained by economic conditions and less by government ideology or 
other influences. 
The puzzle remains, however, because the aforementioned countries 
share a number of constraints that would complicate the attribution of 
responsibility and thus give less credit to economic explanations of party 
support. The first layer of government constraints is their membership in 
the European Union and the Eurozone which combined deteriorate their 
ability to manoeuvre policy (Lobo and Lewis-Beck, 2012; Hobolt, Tilley 
and Wittrock, N.d.). After the beginning of the financial crisis (that 
officially started in September 2008) and because of the high borrowing 
interests, these nations (with the exception of Spain) signed 
international loan agreements that were accompanied with a strict 
economic programme imposing austerity measures and spending cuts to 
reduce the high debt.  This created the second –and thickest– layer of 
government constraints that dramatically reduced the ability to propose, 
design and implement policy. 
This programme (i.e. the Memorandum) was set up and it is currently 
being supervised by the Troika comprised of the IMF, the European 
Central Bank and the European Union. As with most debt–relief IMF 
missions, the conditionality of the loans is severe. The Memorandum not 
only sets the goals for deficit reduction, but it often imposes which 
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domains or society groups will be affected by the austerity and the cuts.1 
This pattern raises important concerns for democratic accountability. In 
a recent article on Latin American democracies, Alcaniz and Hellwig 
(2011) find that politicians seek to avoid the blame and shift it to non-
elected international actors. These developing democracies have similar 
(though by no means identical) characteristics with the South of Europe 
and voters tend to assign responsibility to the IMF and the global 
economy, a pattern shown to be important for the decline in electoral 
accountability (see Hellwig, 2001). However, this is not what happened 
in recent elections in Southern Europe. 
The paper speaks to this paradox by using Greece as a case study. 
Greece is the country that 1) has experienced the most severe spending 
cuts and wage reductions in the region and 2) where the IMF played the 
most intervening role making the analyses relevant to the previous 
paradox. The paper analyses economic voting in Greece and tests 
whether the variation in economic voting is conditional upon the 
distribution of responsibility between the national government and the 
European Union. The analyses, therefore, leverage additional angles to 
understand the recent crisis and perhaps an empirical tool to speculate 
future developments in Greek politics. The EU is expected to play an 
important part in these developments and the results offer a rather 
gloomy picture of how Greeks perceive the economic role of the Union.  
Parallel to these contributions, the paper offers the first empirical 
dynamic analysis of Greek public opinion complementing recent work on 
                                                 
1 The latter was eloquently put to the Greek officials in September 2012 when the IMF 
inspectors of the Greek economy called for a “bolder plan” to find e 11.5 billion in cuts 
in return of the next instalment. http://www.euronews.com/2012/09/11/greece-
deficit-cut-but-tax-revenue-fails-to-hit-targets/ 
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individual level economic voting (for a recent analysis of Greek economic 
voting, Nezi, 2012).2 The results from the time series model reveal two 
important findings. In line with what Lobo and Lewis-Beck (2012) found 
in their recent individual level analyses, economic voting decreases 
when voters think that the European Union should deal with the 
national economy. What is particularly interesting is the variation of the 
responsibility variable which until 2010 was overwhelmingly pro-
European and changed abruptly after the Memorandum was voted in 
Parliament. In effect, we only see substantial economic voting in the last 
two years in the dataset. This suggests that the causal links in the 
constraints, economy and elections nexus are much more complex than 
initially believed. 
The paper proceeds in the following way; In the next section I set out a 
brief review of the concepts relating to economic voting and proceed 
with a more extensive review of the works linking international 
economic structures, globalisation, and accountability. The Greek case 
and its connection to international and supranational institutions, finally, 
lead to the statistical analyses of the paper. I conclude with a discussion 
of the main findings and the theoretical implications of the paper. 
2.  Theoretical Background   
2.1 Accountability & Economic Voting 
The foundations of economic voting are laid on a simple rule on which 
voters reward a government for a good economy and punish it for a bad 
                                                 
2 Greece has also been part of large cross-sectional datasets (e.g. Duch and Stevenson, 
2008; Van der Brug, Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 2008). 
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one (Kramer, 1983). As a result, improvements in the national economy 
bring about increases in popularity, while a plum- meting economy will 
induce punishment and losses in support.  This rule, in turn, rests on the 
assumption that voters have the capacity to assign responsibility for 
economic outcomes. The clarity or ambiguity in the assignment of 
responsibility has produced a prolific literature on the robustness, the 
stability and the size of economic voting. 
These studies have relied on two basic research designs: First, through 
linking party support with objective economic conditions like the levels 
of unemployment, inflation or/and growth and, secondly, by measuring 
subjective evaluations of performance or prospective and retrospective 
assessments of the financial situation.3  Without entering the debate 
about the endogeneity of subjective economic considerations (see e.g. 
Wilcox and Wlezien, 1993; Wlezien, Franklin and Twiggs, 1997; Evans 
and Andersen, 2006; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011), the hypotheses regarding 
the real economy and party support are less ambiguous. Increases in 
unemployment or inflation should correspond to a decline in governing 
party support, while declines in unemployment or inflation should 
correspond to a reward for the incumbent party that is reflected in 
linear increases in government popularity. In two party systems the 
changes in popularity are -almost- directly reflected in the opposition 
party. In multi-party systems the gains of opposition parties in worsening 
economic conditions is not always symmetric.4 
                                                 
3 For the debate regarding the rivalry between retrospective, prospective, egocentric or 
sociotropic MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson (1992) and Clarke and Stewart (1994) offer an 
interesting discussion. 
4 This has important implications for economic voting in Greece and the May/June election 
results. These implications are being touched upon in the discussion section. 
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The asymmetries in those relationships have raised doubts about the 
stability of the popularity function (but see Bellucci and Lewis-Beck, 
2011). Unemployment, for example, tends to be more important when a 
leftist government is in office, while inflation becomes more salient 
when a right-wing government is ruling.  Moreover, the punishing aspect 
of accountability has found extensive support in the data, while rewards 
for booming economic conditions are only sparse in the literature. 
Works in social psychology by Lau (1982, 1985) and political science by 
Soroka (2006), Key (1966) and Mueller (1973) argue for a larger causal 
importance of negative consequences over neutral or positive that 
underpin this disproportionate “punishment voting”. More recent work, 
however, spells doubts about this asymmetry in the economic vote (see 
Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Van der Brug, Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 
2008; Lenz, 2009). 
The other important asymmetry relates to different individual 
characteristics. For instance, the tangible consequences of the state of 
the economy appear to be disproportionately more important for voters 
who lack political sophistication and for voters who do not have strong 
partisan predispositions (Zaller, 2004). Gomez and Wilson (2001, 2006) 
suggest that low sophisticates will place more weight on national 
economic considerations as they will be likely to link the prospects of the 
national economy with the performance of the governing party (hence 
discounting globalisation, crises etc). At the same time, and in line with 
speculations about the endogeneity in economic voting, incumbent 
partisans tend to exaggerate the health of the national economy (Tilley 
and Hobolt, 2011). 
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 A good proportion of these theories are based on micro evidence. An 
important body of work looks at contextual variation in economic voting. 
The seminal work on the Clarity of Responsibility suggests that 
institutional factors also induce instability.  These factors tend to 
condition the levels of economic voting and again relate to how clear the 
attribution of credit and blame is (Powell and Whitten, 1993; Anderson, 
1995, 2000). These include constitutional arrangements like the 
presence of a bicameral opposition, how cohesive are the incumbent 
governments (see Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2012) and whether the 
electoral system promotes coalition or minority governments. Such 
cases make praising or sanctioning the government harder and more 
ambiguous (but see Samuels and Hellwig, 2010). 
To be sure, Greece is a high clarity democracy, where the ease in 
attributing credit and blame should facilitate economic voting. Given 
that this is the first time series analyses of economic voting in Greece, 
the theoretical expectations should favour high levels of account- ability. 
Still, the last 10-12 years have changed a lot about how the Greek 
economy operates, initially with the introduction of the Euro currency 
and more recently with the IMF loans. Very recent literature has 
examined how international political and economic institutions relate to 
the size of the economic vote. 
2.2 International Constraints & Electoral Accountability 
For the last thirty years the international economic structures have 
changed substantially. As a result, next to the national economies, there 
exists a global economy. Mass political behaviour has been affected by 
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this shift by complicating the assignment of government responsibility 
for economic outcomes (Hellwig and Samuels, 2007). 
The association between globalisation and domestic electoral politics is 
primarily related the ability elected politicians have to propose and 
implement policies. There are two views concerning the room to 
manouevre. The first is informed by the idea that a country’s integration 
to the global financial system only leaves limited room to decide for and 
implement policy (e.g Hays, 2003). Others, on the other hand, maintain 
that even though trade relations are more open than ever, and that 
capital flows are pivotal for economic growth, there is still space to 
implement policies and, consequently, the key functions of electoral 
competition are not shallow (Garrett, 1998). From a different 
perspective, some have suggested that globalisation (trade openness in 
particular) tends to improve the voters’ ability to evaluate the 
competence of a government to deliver economic policies (Scheve, 
2001; Alesina, Londregan and Rosenthal, 1993). 
The debate is only empirically settled and the findings conform to the 
work by Hellwig and his colleagues who report that globalisation tends 
to suppress the levels of economic voting (Hellwig, 2001; Hellwig and 
Samuels, 2007). The key aspect of this explanation is premised on the 
following idea: 
“in closed economies, it is difficult for politicians to escape blame for 
poor economic performance.  Globalisation, however, provides politicians 
with a tool to blame poor economic performance on factors beyond their 
control . . .” (Hellwig and Samuels, 2007: 288). 
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As a result, politicians seek to avoid the blame and voters need to be 
able to distribute responsibility to non-electorally dependent decision-
makers (NEDDs). This tendency creates additional fluctuations in the 
economic vote. 
Duch and Stevenson (2010), for example, suggest that voters inform 
their political decisions by ‘extracting signals’ from unexpected shocks in 
the economy. On this account, voters have the capacity to distinguish 
between shocks caused by the incumbent’s –managerial– competence 
from shocks caused by exogenous factors. In effect, this process makes it 
possible for voters to cast informed –economic– votes. The actual 
mechanism expects voters to compare the variances in the competency 
component and the international shocks and then hold the national 
government responsible if the variation in the competence shock is 
larger than the international. 
In a similar vein, Kayser and Peress (2012) show evidence for economic 
benchmarking. That is, voters compare and contrast their own countries’ 
economic performance to their neighbours’ or the global economy. This 
facilitates the process of arriving at a clearer appreciation of the 
governments’ ability to deliver good economic outcomes net of 
exogenous economic circumstances. For Kayser and Peress, economic 
benchmarking increases the clarity in the assessment of economic 
performance and thus tends to reduce the instabilities in the economic 
vote. 
The different mechanisms that inform the accountability–economy–
globalisation nexus (manoeuvrability, benchmarking and competency 
signals) offer important insights about the works of accountability. The 
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key expectation is that the collective voting weights on the economy will 
vary substantially across different levels of exposure and integration to 
international structures. What remains less understood, however, is how 
voters distribute responsibility in occasions when non-elected officials 
influence the decisions of elected governments. Better suited to the 
paper’s theme, what are the electoral implications when a high–debt 
country has the International Monetary Fund as a lender? 
The key aspect of the IMF’s role on accountability is the conditionality of 
the loans. The conditions, which in the Greek case were passed as a law 
from the Parliament, pertain to a set of policies required in exchange for 
financial resources. In the case the conditions are met, the funds 
(installments) are withheld. In order to avoid bankruptcy, or for Greece’s 
case the sudden return to the drachma, countries conform to those 
conditions in order to receive the loan installments. This conditionality is 
leaving only limited room to decide for policy amplifying the concerns 
about democratic interactions and accountability. Recent research on 
Latin America by Alcaniz and Hellwig (2011) illuminates the problem. 
Alcaniz and Hellwig (2011)’s argument, that finds support in the data, is 
that responsibility has international, contextual and individual variation. 
More specifically, the results show that much of the blame for low 
growth and market volatility is assigned to non-elected actors like the 
IMF and the World Bank. As a consequence, “When voters grant 
responsibility to non-elected actors, they lighten the burden placed on 
the government’s choices and execution.” (2011:390). The empirical 
results also show that additional contextual factors can influence how 
successfully politicians shirk responsibility in Latin American democracies 
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(Alcaniz and Hellwig, 2011: 410). This creates a loop-hole in the quality 
of democratic interactions and suppresses the degree of economic 
voting. The political systems in Southern Europe, and particularly in 
Greece, are currently experiencing similar international pressures. The 
main difference is the well–established role of the European Union in 
their domestic politics and particularly its role as part of the IMF/ECB/EU 
Troika. 
As in federal states, European electorates have to distinguish whether 
policy choices and outcomes are the responsibility of the sovereign 
government or the European Union. This is reflected in the way 
European voters assign responsibility for government policy. Hobolt, 
Tilley and Wittrock (N.d.) find that much of this difficulty in assigning 
responsibility corresponds to the levels and the sources of information 
(see also Johns, 2011). They argue that voters assign responsibility by 
following partisan cues charged with favourable and unfavourable 
opinions about the Union.  These patterns also have implications about 
the levels of economic voting. Lobo and Lewis-Beck (2012) show that 
voters who hold the European Union accountable for national economic 
policy accord less weights on economic considerations when they cast 
their votes. The evidence, that are based on survey data from Spain, 
Portugal, Italy and Greece, support their main ‘European integration’ 
argument on which the European Union and the Eurozone are important 
layers of governance that tend to obscure the attribution of 
responsibility in the European South and thus suppress economic voting 
(see also, Anderson, 2006). 
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3. Distribution of Responsibility and Public Opinion, 2000-2012 
Individual perceptions of responsibility, like the ones used by Lobo and 
Lewis-Beck (2012), are helpful to understand individual variation in 
political behaviour and accountability. Aggregate assessments of those 
opinions can highlight dynamic processes in the electorates. Figure 1 
displays the percentages of voters reporting whether Greece (dashed 
line) or the EU or other international organisations (solid line) should be 
responsible to deal with important Greek problems. The dashed vertical 
axis corresponds to quarter when the Greek parliament voted in favour 
of the IMF/ECB/EU bailout loans and the economic measures attached 
to them. The chart is derived from the survey question, “Do you believe 
that important issues should be dealt with at the national level, or within 
international unions, like the European Union?”. 
FIGURE 1: European and National Responsibility to Deal with Important 
Issues 
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The plot starts in 2004 and the final reading is from the first quarter of 
2012. The data reveals interesting patterns about the relevant attitudes. 
First of all, the EU as an answer has the lead for the vast majority of the 
series. The two time points when the two groups appear closer are the 
second quarter of 2005 and the first quarter of 2008. In the first instance 
the newly elected New Democracy government admitted to EU officials 
that the Greek deficit is larger than initially believed (and recorded by 
previous PASOK governments) while the second possibly coincides with 
the period immediately after the Lisbon treaty that was voted in the end 
of 2007.5 
After 2009 the EU series drifted further apart in the anticipation of a 
European assistance to resolve the debt problem and avoid bankruptcy. 
In 2010, however, the Greek government was unable to borrow money 
from the markets and begun negotiations with the Union and the IMF. 
The percentage of Greeks in favour of Europe as a vehicle to solve 
important issues shrunk and a quarter after the parliamentary vote on 
the international bail–out loan, the two series crossed making the 
national government the preferred institution to resolve important 
issues. The processes that might explain some of the variation in the 
series presented in Figure 1, might also be important to explain 
government vote intentions which is displayed in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Given that the data i s  quarterly, some reservations should be held about the  role 
of these events on public opinion. A rigorous analysis of the role of events is not 
provided in this paper. 
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FIGURE 2: Quarterly Greek Party Support, 2000-2012 
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Figure 2 presents the main time series to be analysed in this paper.  The 
figure plots the aggregate vote intentions for the two major parties that 
have governed Greece in the last 35 years. The dashed vertical lines 
denote the 4 elections that have taken place during the period under 
investigation (03/2000, 03/2004, 09/2007, 10/2009).  The series, like the 
one in Figure 1, shows data gathered from face to face interviews from a 
representative sample of 1200-1400 Greeks that were provided with a 
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ballot box to mimic the actual voting process.6 This method ensures that 
problems like interviewer effects or social desirability do not influence 
the quality of the survey responses.  The green line corresponds to 
PASOK support and the blue to New Democracy’s. The top series with 
the black line corresponds to government support which is the key 
dependent variable in the analyses to follow. The measure of party 
support is constructed using the traditional “If there were a general 
election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?” vote intention 
question. 
The series begins just before the 2000 election that gave PASOK and 
Costas Simitis a very fragile majority (PASOK’s third consecutive) in 
Parliament. Immediately after the election, the governing party started 
losing public support even though two major events like the official 
introduction of the Euro currency and the historical dealing with the 
terrorist organisation “17th of November”7 could be counted as 
important successes. With the electoral prospects for a re-election in 
2004 looking slim, Simitis resigned from the party leadership and gave 
way to George A. Papandreou (flagged as GAP—Ring in Figure 2) that 
boosted PASOK’s support instantaneously, yet not sufficiently enough to 
win the election in March 2004. 
Costas Karamanlis and the newly elected government dealt with the final 
details and the organisation of the 2004 Athens Olympics. The hardest 
aim, however, was to sustain the boosting economy (5% growth just 
                                                 
6 The survey data was gathered by the prominent polling company Metron Analysis which is 
a member of the Hellenic and European Market Research Association and member of the 
Worldwide Association of Public Opinion Research. 
7 Prominent terrorist organisation that operated from the early 1980’s until the early 
2000’s. 
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before the election) and capitalise on the success of the games. Though 
the Olympics were successful, the national economy did not continue 
growing at previous rates.  The rates of unemployment, however, 
followed a slow but constant declining trend.  Until 2007, when the next 
election took place, only few politicians would express their fears about 
the economy and, in general, Greek politics were as usual. Allegations 
about corruption scandals, mismanagement, a sustainable economy and, 
undoubtedly, lack of awareness of what was about to happen in the 
global financial system. In the 2007 election, the campaign is dominated 
by the wildfires in the Peloponnese and though New Democracy won by 
a 3% margin (yet with a 4.5% decline in support), the actual translation 
to parliamentary seats only secured a fragile majority of 153 (out of 
300). A combination of events along with the 2008 economic meltdown 
further shrunk the electoral appeal of New Democracy and after 10 
years of trailing in the polls, PASOK became the election favourite. 
Indeed, in October 2009 Papandreou won a landslide with 44% of the 
vote and 160 MPs. 
Even before the 2009 election there were serious concerns about 
Greece’s ability to borrow money from the financial markets. The 
reaction from the Greek government was to borrow more money to 
convince the EU partners of its creditworthiness. After PASOK’s victory 
and, more notably, after the announcement that the budget deficit is 
not 3% but 12%, the spread of the 10 year Greek bond drifted upwards 
and the country’s ratings were being constantly downgraded by all rating 
agencies (like Fitch, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s etc.).8 After six months 
                                                 
8 The second time in four years that the elected Greek government admits that the official 
Greek statistics are not trustworthy. 
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of deliberation and unsuccessful efforts to minimise the budget deficit 
and reduce the sovereign debt, Papandreou announced (April 2010) that 
the Greek government would ask from its EU partners to prepare a 
rescue package. The bailout package was voted in the Greek parliament 
the following May. The Troika (European Central Bank, European Union 
and the International Monetary Fund ) gave a loan of e 100 billion and 
started monitoring the agreed upon reforms that were primarily 
concerned with the reduction of the budget deficit. 
Throughout this period (2008-2012) both governments that served in 
office would be use the international economy to escape the blame for 
the economic downturn. For example, Karamanlis ran the 2009 election 
on the basis that the economic decline was out of his hands and that the 
credit crunch along with the Autumn collapse of Lehmann Brothers 
brought about the domestic economic problems. While in opposition 
Papandreou tried to elevate the importance of Karamanlis’ dealings with 
the economy and only rarely used the international economy as the 
main reason for the decline. When PASOK came in power, Papandreou 
continued blaming the previous government (even after 2010) and 
begun accusing the global financial system (Hedge Funds, Rating 
Agencies, etc.). Very often he would criticize the passive role of the EU in 
dealing with financial speculators. However, the economic consequences 
of the Memorandum were too severe to be ignored from voters.  
The political consequences of the Memorandum 
Even though the Memorandum (i.e. the bailout conditions) would 
promote a series of structural economic reforms, its main concern was 
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the shrinking of the sovereign debt through increasing taxes (both direct 
and indirect) and reducing government spending through horizontal cuts 
in public sector jobs. In effect, within a year there was a 30% cut in 
salaries in the public sector, a 2% increase in VAT, and a substantial 
increase in ad hoc property taxation. The economic consequences were 
immediate with an enormous increase in unemployment, shrinking 
output and growing income inequality.  At the same time, the actual 
national debt increased by almost 20% and in the last quarter of 2011 
the GDP growth shrunk by 7%. Besides the actual failure to deal with the 
basic problem (i.e. the sovereign debt) the conditionality of the loans 
and the consequences of the cuts brought about social and political 
unrest. 
The growing public discontent towards the elected Greek government 
and some opposition MPs triggered one of the longest protests in the 
centre of Athens that lasted for more than three months. The reasoning 
behind these protests was 1) the austerity measures and its severe 
consequences and 2) the popular belief that the national sovereignty 
was on hold due to the two rescue packages and the IMF impositions. In 
reality, the actual room to manoeuvre the economy was indeed limited 
because of the mutual agreement between the Greek government and 
its international lenders (IMF/ECB/EU).9 If one combines the apparently 
unsuccessful efforts to reduce the debt and the simultaneous increase in 
unemployment and shrink in output, the Greek government was at a 
deadlock after being in office for less than two years. 
                                                 
9 Note however here that the elected Greek parliament voted in favour of the two 
bailout agreements with 172 MPs in May 2010 and 216 in February 2012. 
 
  19 
By January 2011, the Papandreou administration was becoming 
increasingly unpopular. The latest polls (last quarter of 2011) would 
indicate that PASOK had lost more than 75% of its electoral support as 
compared to the 2009 election. After an unsuccessful first attempt in 
June 2011, Papandreou re-initiated discussions with the other parties in 
the parliament to form an interim coalition government with him 
resigned from the prime ministerial position. Indeed, after the October 
2011 EU Summit in Brussels that secured a second rescue package along 
with more than 50% haircut of the debt (€203 billion debt reduction in 
total), Papandreou resigned and Lucas Papademos (former central 
banker) took over the position and formed a government with a cabinet 
comprising of ministers from PASOK, New Democracy and the Populist 
right-wing party LAOS.10 The final data point corresponds to the quarter 
the 6 May election took place that confirmed the collapse of the two 
mainstream parties.  In those two elections the Greek voters gave a huge 
boost to SYRIZA’s percentages and the Neo–Fascist party –Golden 
Dawn– secured several positions in the Greek Parliament winning 7% of 
the vote (almost half a million). There is no doubt that the economy 
plays some role in this process. 
                                                 
10 LAOS eventually left the coalition just before the parliamentary vote on the second 
rescue package. At the same time, an important faction of New Democracy also left the 
party and formed the ‘Independent Greeks’. The Independent Greeks parties won 7% of 
the vote in the June 2012 election, while LAOS did not pass the 3% threshold to elect MPs. 
LAOS’ polling numbers are currently below 1% (10/2012). 
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4. Empirics 
Intuition and some evidence would promote the idea that economic 
voting in Greece is high and robust. As said, Greece is a high clarity 
nation predominantly electing one party government with a stable party 
system (at least until 2009). The actual election results in 2009 and 2012 
as well as comparative empirical evidence (e.g. Bartels, 2011; Nezi, 
2012), show that economics are an important consideration for the 
Greek electorate.11 
In what follows I present some simple accountability models that are 
specified to capture the impact of the objective economy on governing 
party support. The dependent variable in this model is the proportion of 
Greek citizens reporting that they would vote for the government if an 
election would take place. The key explanatory variable, that I label 
Objective Economy, represents the misery index (unemployment+ 
inflation), which is expected to exert a negative effect.12  In other words, 
increases unemployment or/and inflation are expected to lead to losses 
in governing party support. 
Table 1 presents four OLS time series models of governing party support. 
Column 1 reports regression coefficients showing the negative 
relationship between the objective economy and party support. The 
actual impact of lagged economic conditions (ObjectiveEconomyt−1) is 
highly statistically significant (βmodel1 = −0.481) even though the model 
                                                 
11 In the following analyses I do not include additional explanatory variables that are 
known to be robust individual level predictors of party support. Although some of these 
sociological/psychological voting explanations (see Campbell et al., 1960) could be 
found, their analyses at the macro level are not really illuminating. The movements of 
the party identification series are almost identical to that of vote intentions. 
12 Economic variables were gathered from www.statistics.gr, the official portal of the 
Hellenic Statistical Authority. 
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specification controls for dynamics via the endogenous lagged version of 
party support (GovernmentSupportt−1). Besides adding dynamics to the 
model specification the endogenous lag variable safely captures any 
prior shocks or any other omitted considerations in the dependent 
variable. Alternative specifications (without endogenous lag and the 
economy at time “t”) lead to the same conclusions. 
These results suggest that worsening economic conditions bring about a 
decline in government popularity, a result that conforms with the notion 
of electoral accountability. To increase confidence in the empirical 
assessment, I include a set of controls that might alter the relationship. 
For model stability model 2 includes a trend variable, (Trend) that starts 
from 0 in the first observation and adds one point until the end of the 
dataset, an index of important political events (Events )13 and an election 
dummy (Elections ) variable that takes the score of 1 in an election 
quarter and 0 otherwise. Even after the inclusion of the controls, the 
impact of the economy remains strong and statistically significant 
(βmodel2 = −0.495). 
TABLE 1: Time Series Ordinary Least Square Models of Governing Party 
Support 
DV: GovernmentSupportt (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GovernmentSupportt−1 
0.889*** 
(0.083) 
0.845*** 
(0.077) 
0.886*** 
(0.076) 
0.882*** 
(0.074) 
ObjectiveEconomyt−1 
-0.481*** 
(0.175) 
-0.495*** 
(0.182) 
-0.436** 
(0.182) 
-0.273 
(0.166) 
Election  0.283 (1.105) 
0.355 
(1.114) 
-0.124 
(1.277) 
                                                 
13 Most of them are depicted in Figure 1. Additional events include the quarter the greek 
police arrested the 17N terrorist group, the Summer of the Olympic games, the 
Grigoropoulos events, Vatopedi, the Phone hacking incident, the Zahopoulos events and 
the Junkbonds scandal. 
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DV: GovernmentSupportt (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Events  -0.386 (0.838) 
-0.104 
(0.849) 
-0.170 
(0.872) 
Trend  -0.046* (0.026) 
-0.035 
(0.025) 
-0.013 
(0.032) 
Imfvote (May2010)   -4.331*** (1.037)  
Constant 9.659* (4.912) 
12.490** 
(4.903) 
10.117** 
(4.820) 
7.761* 
(4.400) 
N 2000Q2-2012Q1 
2000Q2-
2012Q1 
2000Q2-
2012Q1 
2000Q2-
2010Q2 
R2 0.892 0.901 0.909 0.840 
Note: Heteroscedasticity Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The model presented in Column 3 adds to the specification a dummy 
variable which seeks to control for the official beginning of the 
bailout/rescue package. The variable is scored 1 for the second quarter 
of 2010 (the actual parliamentary vote took place on May) and 0 
otherwise. The impact, as expected, is significant and it appears that 
PASOK’s government lost around 4.5 percentage points just for passing 
the Memorandum from the Greek Parliament. Even when controlling for 
the IMFVote (May2010) event, however, the impact of the economy 
remains strong (though the β is smaller than in model 2) and statistically 
significant, suggesting that much of what is happening in the political 
realm has dual antecedents; the giveaway of national sovereignty and 
the abrupt economic decline (and their combination).14  
Model 4, finally, only includes the observations before the bail–out 
(2010Q2). This model is presented to give a rough appreciation of the 
democratic interactions before the IMF/ECB/EU loans. The main 
                                                 
14 I discuss that in more detail later in the paper. 
  23 
explanatory variable Objective Economy is now indistinguishable from 
zero (βmodel5 = 0.149, p > 0.1), while none of the remaining variables 
exert a substantial effect on governing party vote intention. These 
results raise speculations that the size and the significance of the 
economic variable might be heightened in that final period within the 
sample that relates to the dramatic decrease in output and the abrupt 
increase in unemployment. 
This speculation can be further explored by looking at the temporal 
variation in the economic vote. Although the optimal empirical strategy 
is to estimate dynamic conditional correlations via a bivariate GARCH 
model (Lebo and Box-Steffensmeier, 2008), the very limited number of 
observations makes the task difficult.  Instead, I estimate a multivariate 
rolling regression with four Moving Windows. Given that within the 
rolling regression framework it is expected to sacrifice observations, the 
first four quarters are omitted from the analyses. The estimated 
coefficient for the objective economy is plotted in Figure 3 and it should 
be examined as follows: The straight horizontal line features the 
constant coefficient with 95% confidence bands. The varying line 
measures the size of the coefficient over time while the dashed lines 
around it represent the 95% confidence intervals. To conclude that there 
is a statistically significant the confidence intervals should not include a 
zero and theory expects the varying line to be below zero (i.e. negative). 
As it is clear from the plot, the periods when the economy is weighted in 
the voters’ calculations are few. What is interesting is that the period 
after the election of New Democracy in 2004 the uncertainty around the 
estimate increases substantially. This is presumably due to the fact that 
the previous government had stayed in office for almost 11 consecutive 
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years and the assignment of responsibility about economic outcomes 
was ambiguous. Equally interesting is the variation of the economic vote 
during the final observations in the sample when we only observe 
substantive economic voting (plus the second quarter of 2008). This 
corroborates the findings reported in Table 1.15 
FIGURE 3: Rolling Regression Estimates of Economic Voting Over Time 
(4MW) 
 
 
The introductory discussion on whether this is a puzzling finding 
(reported in both comparative and Greek analyses by Bartels (2011) and 
Nezi (2012) respectively) is again important. This final period 
corresponds to the period when the Greek government only had 
minuscule room to manoeuvre the economy, while, simultaneously 
                                                 
15 However, some reservations should be held with rolling coefficients as they are not 
stable across different specifications.  The rolling coefficient presented in Figure 3 is from 
a simple specification that controls for elections and political events. However, 
alternative specifications more or less corroborate the main findings of the study. 
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benchmarking would be unfavorable to any national or international 
comparison. The paper argues that over the same period the way voters 
attribute responsibility also changed. 
To test whether economic voting varies along with the future 
responsibility attribution I construct a variable measuring the share of 
Greeks thinking that the National Government relative to those believing 
the EU is better at dealing with important issues (GreekResponsibility). 
After this manipulation, scores at the region of 0.5 denote equal share of 
opinions in the electorate while scores closer to 1 denote beliefs that 
Greece is best able to deal the important problems in Greece.16 The 
lagged version of this variable is then interacted with the lagged rate of 
unemployment and included in the accountability model. 
TABLE 2: OLS model with multiplicative term 
DV: GovernmentSupportt Coef. 
Unemployment t−1 
3.144*** 
(1.318) 
GreekResponsibilityt−1 
44.418 
(30.682) 
Greece ×Unemploymentt−1 
-7.418*** 
(2.552) 
Elections 1.460 (1.385) 
Imfvote(May2010) -5.040*** (2.683) 
Trend 
-0.498*** 
(0.053) 
Constant 30.282* (15.187) 
N 32 
R2 0.949 
Note: Heteroscedasticity Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 
16 The variable is worked out as follows: Greece/(Greece+EU) 
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The results are reported in Table 2. It should be noticed that the number 
of observations drop to 32 because the survey question was first asked 
in 2004. The important variable here is the sign of the interaction term 
(GreekResponsibilityt−1 ×Unemploymentt−1) which renders a significant 
negative coefficient. This suggests that in higher values of the 
Responsibility variable (Greek Responsibility) the larger the economic 
vote. To visualize this relationship I plot the marginal effect and the 
simulated confidence intervals. The conditional relationship is displayed 
in Figure 4. 
FIGURE 4: Economic Voting Conditional upon EU/National 
Responsibility 
 
 
As it was noted before the 0.5 point on the X-Axis represents an equal 
share of responses, while values closer to 1 denote more respondents 
preferring the national government to deal with important issues. In 
effect, the plot, as with the regression coefficient, suggests that the 
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larger the proportion of voters who think that important issues should 
be dealt by the elected national government, the higher the levels of 
accountability.  As with the model specification in Table 1, this model 
also controls for a time trend to increase the reliability of the parameter 
estimates. The confidence in the results is discussed in more detail in the 
next section which also reports robustness checks for the model 
specification presented in Table 1. 
Sensitivity Analyses 
A final assessment of the empirical exercise is to assess the robustness 
of the empirical specification to the issue of autocorrelation. For this 
reason I estimate two set of models that entertain some concerns about 
the data generating process. Model 1 that is being reported in Table 2 
presents an OLS time series model with Newey West standard errors (3# 
lags) to account for the fact that some missing observations in the 
dependent variable where linearly interpolated. The polling company 
that collected the data reports three observations per year. The 
interpolation might induce serial correlation and the Newey West 
standard errors can insure that the main inferences from the models are 
not driven by autocorrelation. Model 2, similarly, presents a Prais-
Winsten generalised least square model to account for residual 
autocorrelation. Both models in Table 2 use the decomposed measures 
of the Misery Index, i.e. inflation and unemployment, and the results 
suggest that the main driver of economic voting is the levels of 
unemployment. This should be anticipated as the actual levels of 
inflation have stayed low due to the decrease in demand. Finally, the 
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decomposed specification in Table 2 brings about the same results when 
plugged in the model specification reported in Table 1. 
TABLE 3: Time Series Generalized Least Square Models of Governing 
Party Support 
DV: GovernmentSupportt (1) (2) 
GovernmentSupportt−1 
0.886*** 
(0.065)  
0.790*** 
(0.108) 
ObjectiveEconomyt−1 
-0.436*** 
(0.145) 
-0.531** 
(0.199) 
Election 0.355 (0.963) 
-0.632 
(1.258) 
Events -0.104 (0.892) 
-0.409 
(0.688) 
Trend -0.035 (0.024) 
-0.038  
(0.037) 
Imfvote(May2010) -4.331*** (1.067) 
-5.684** 
(2.185) 
Constant 10.117** (3.780) 
14.734** 
(5.945) 
N 2000Q2-2012Q1 2000Q2-2012Q1 
R2 N/A 0.84 
Note: Heteroscedasticity Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The second set of analysis corresponds to Table 2 and Figure 4 which 
need further discussion. The recent work at the individual level from 
Lobo and Lewis-Beck (2012) basically shows that voters who think that 
the national government is responsible for economic out- comes are 
more likely to vote on the basis of subjective economic considerations. 
The model in Table 3 examines the same relationship but from a 
dynamic perspective substituting subjective economic perceptions with 
the real economy. 
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However, the relationship might be more complex. Is it realistic to argue 
that Responsibility “truly” conditions economic voting? Many would 
argue that the interaction term is a mere multiplication of 
unemployment by itself. In effect, during the period when 
unemployment increased so rapidly, the anti–EU sentiments also 
increased making the multiplicative relationship non–causal and 
spurious. To test that point of view I purge the Responsibility variable 
from its economic (i.e. unemployment) determinants and then plug it in 
to the model specification.  This way the interaction term captures the 
true covariance between public opinion and the economy rather than 
representing the mere multiplication of unemployment by itself. 
FIGURE 5: Economic Voting Conditional upon Purged EU/National 
Responsibility 
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The conditional relationship presented in Figure 5 shows a picture 
identical to the plot in Figure 4. Economic voting is still conditional upon 
responsibility perceptions even when responsibility is purged from its 
economic antecedents.17  For reasons discussed below, the relationship 
presented in Figure 4 is intuitively valid when responsibility is measured 
without any manipulations (i.e. as in Table 2). 
The economy is the single most important contextual factor that not 
only determines government popularity in contemporary democracies, 
but also exerts indirect effects on political considerations that tend to 
correlate with party support.  Economic conditions correlate with party 
identification (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1989), perceptions of 
competence (Green and Jennings, 2012), movements in the policy mood 
(Bartle, Dellepiane-Avellaneda and Stimson, 2011). Similarly, the 
simultaneous correlation between economics and vote intentions and 
perceptions of responsibility with economics denote the dramatic 
change in Greek politics after the economic crisis. The movements in 
those series are by no means distinct, but they do represent the 
aggregate change in the way the Greek electorate thinks about 
responsibility and how this, in turn, modulates the overtime patterns in 
electoral accountability. On top of that, a careful inspection of Figure 1 
that displays the Responsibility time series and Figure 4 that plots the 
economic vote would affirm that the economic vote was heightened in 
periods when the proportions saying Greece should be responsible were 
as many as the proportions saying that the EU should resolve domestic 
                                                 
17 When predicting vote intentions from unemployment and responsibility, both variables 
exert statistically significant effects. When the Responsibility measure is substituted by 
its purged equivalent, it seizes to be significant. 
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issues. Such periods come before quarters we observe economic voting 
as this is depicted in Figure 4. This is the case for the first two quarters of 
2005 when there is a sharp decline in the rolling coefficient estimate. For 
the second quarter of 2008a similar increase in economic voting (i.e. 
decline in the line) renders a statistically significant effect. In both cases, 
Greece is not under a binding international agreement and not visibly 
affected by the current crisis. 
5. Discussion  
Even though studies like this one appear regularly in peer-reviewed 
journals, the Greek data explored here offer the unique opportunity to 
examine a democracy before and during an economic crisis. The most 
important aspect of this period is that coincides with an unprecedented 
limitation of the room to propose and implement policies imposed by 
the IMF/ECB/EU bail–out loan conditions. The empirical findings of the 
article draw an interesting, if not peculiar, portrait of contemporary 
Greek politics. The peculiarity is based on the fact that before the 
international interventions democratic interactions in Greece were 
loose, making Greece an outlier in the prolific literature on 
accountability (Bellucci and Lewis-Beck, 2011). Moreover, during the 
period when we do observe economic voting, both theory and (for many 
scholars) intuition would predict lower levels of accountability. 
Why theories about globalisation and accountability made false 
predictions about Greece (and perhaps other democracies)?  Given that 
a portion of this literature is based on the ‘room to manoeuvre’ thesis, 
this finding should be regarded as an anomaly. To be sure, the room  to 
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manoeuvre is not wrong and both the empirical results that support it 
are robust and the actual theory entirely  plausible. However, when 
economic conditions change so dramatically over such a short period, 
the manoeuvrability condition might exert a curvilinear (U-shaped) 
impact. In other words, economic voting is high when national 
governments have full control over the economy (fully closed 
economies) and when international institutions fully take over the 
economic programme implemented by the government. In the middle 
points, which correspond to open economies with limited room to 
influence economic policy but with some room to avoid the blame for 
bad outcomes, economic voting is being suppressed. It is undeniable 
that the recent crisis is an excellent opportunity to test these theoretical 
implications. In addition to this paper on Greece, more research on 
Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Italy would further our understanding of 
how the crisis changes the way accountability works. 
If the grievances asymmetry hypothesis is correct and voters are better 
at punishing as compared to rewarding a government, it could be that 
what the paper finds for Greece is just a function of the asymmetric 
nature of economic voting. This is not unreasonable and the volume of 
economic decline makes the argument more plausible. On this account, 
the disproportionate punishment of the government is the product of 
the abrupt and unprecedented decline in all economic indicators.  When 
unemployment doubles in just over a year, voters will not respond to the 
government’s effort to avoid the blame and will punish it irrespective of 
the room to manoeuvre. 
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The results are in line with the above claim but also show that before the 
crisis there was no substantive pattern of reward or punishment in the 
Greek electorate.  A good scenario is that Greece was moving with the 
financial tide and thus economic benchmarking (Kayser and Peress, 
2012) made it unnecessary to hold the government accountable. When 
the international comparisons were against the Greek economy (i.e. 
asymmetric decline), the Greek electorate started placing (more) weight 
on the real economy.  A more worrisome scenario aligns with some of 
the conventional allegations about pre-memorandum Greece and 
clientelistic party politics on which personal welfare was not directly 
related to national economic improvements. Unfortunately for Greece 
and its citizens, agent-based models of accountability show how 
dangerous this pattern is. Governments have incentives to deliver a 
good economy only when voters decide on that basis. 
Recent works in political psychology offer a useful angle to understand 
why we observe such an abrupt change in the way the Greek electorate 
voted. According to this literature, voters have two systems that guide 
the way they engage in politics. The first system (called disposition 
system) corresponds to emotions like enthusiasm while the second 
pertains to emotions like anxiety fear and anger (surveillance system) 
(see Marcus et al 2000; Neumann et al., 2007; MacKuen et al., 2010). 
These studies have found that the disposition system of enthusiasm 
encourages habitual behavior and reliance on prior dispositions and 
partisan attachments. The surveillance system, on the other hand, which 
is triggered by fear and anxiety, tends to induce political deliberation, 
effortful thinking and makes citizens open to new information. To link 
this with accountability, the “enthusiasm” years made the Greek 
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electorate less responsive to economic reality, but when their 
surveillance system was activated the agents of the economic downturn 
were heavily punished. 
The paper also shows evidence that after the bail–out agreement the 
Greek electorate changed the way the assign responsibility for important 
issues like the economy. The actual pattern here is interesting. The 
smaller the room to manoeuvre, the more voters think that the Greek 
government should be responsible without supranational interventions. 
It appears that the Greeks not only punished the government for poor 
economic performance, but also for allowing those international 
interventions. Had those interventions been successful, however, 
perhaps no punishment would have followed. This is an important 
finding that is in line with recent research at the individual level 
(Anderson, 2006; Lobo and Lewis-Beck, 2012; Hobolt, Tilley and 
Wittrock, N.d.). 
Moreover, it appears that the distribution of responsibility nicely maps 
the ideological divisions in contemporary Greek politics. What appears in 
Figure 1 is a good approximation of a new and powerful political 
cleavage in contemporary Greek politics that will be there for some time 
to determine voting behaviour and, consequently, public choices. 
Although Greeks still believe that the country’s future is in the Eurozone 
(around 70% in favour in public opinion polls), they cast serious doubts 
about the role they want the European Union to play in deciding and 
implementing domestic policy. In terms of electoral choices, party 
attitudes towards Europe (and the Memorandum in general) will be the 
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primary cue for voters to evaluate economic and political information 
and make up their minds in future elections. 
Finally, there is one question that is difficult to answer.  If accountability 
is a sign of healthy democratic interactions, is it the case that Greek 
democracy is healthier after the international interventions? The 
immediate answer is no. Greece still cannot decide for its economic 
policy while many of its parliamentary parties do not conform to the rule 
of law. During the two recent elections turnout declined, in the May 6 
election about 18% of the electorate did not see their choices in 
parliament, while 7% chose the ultra–nationalist (and not fanatically 
democratic) Golden-Dawn party.  With economic projections for 2013 
expecting unemployment near 30% or more (currently at 25%) and the 
Greek political system currently looking extremely fragile, any political 
prediction would be rather gloomy. It appears that the post mortem 
accumulative punishment taking place will produce more crises, of 
different sort. The mere fact that the EU is a constitutive partner of the 
Troika makes the solutions harder and complicates the future political 
developments in Greece. 
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